It is widely recognised that cooperation between stakeholders is required to counter maritime security threats and to provide a safe environment for the maritime industry to work in. While stakeholders already cooperate to some extent, there is a need to find common ground on improved security cooperation. This can be done by building trust to ensure information exchange, avoiding misunderstandings, and addressing the long response times to piracy incidents (and maritime crime in general) in the Gulf of Guinea.

For this reason, the Centre for Stabilisation at the Royal Danish Defence College organises the Maritime Dialogue Platform (MDP) seminars to bring individuals from maritime authorities and the maritime industry together. The aim is to identify obstacles in cooperation, create recommendations for how to improve security, build relations, and create mutual understanding for future solutions. As a step in this program, CFS organised a seminar on the 29th of March in Accra, Ghana, in close cooperation with the Multinational Maritime Coordination Centre (MMCC).

The participating individuals represented a broad range of stakeholders, including the maritime industry (Maersk, CMA-CGM, MSC, PIL, SOAAG, among others) and maritime authorities (Ghana Navy, Maritime Authority, Ports and Harbours Authority, and the MMCCs in Accra and Cotonou) and others.

The maritime industry expressed strong concerns about safety for seafarers and the potential negative impact on maritime trade. They called for armed guards/private security personnel to be allowed on board merchant vessels as a short-term, quick-impact solution. This would address the concerns of the industry and buy time for the regional states to build capacities and develop sustainable solutions.

The maritime authorities highlighted the progress that has already been achieved. Information sharing is working well and efforts against pirates have been successful but also led to a shift in pirates’ modus operandi: Increasingly, pirate attacks take place far from shore where it is more difficult for security forces to reach and therefore the response time is longer.

Purposeful Information Exchange

Among the topics discussed at the seminar were information exchange between authorities and the industry. Information exchange includes incident reporting, general information sharing, and the facilitation of contact with other relevant authorities. The maritime industry highlights the need for simplicity in information exchange, for example by having a single point of contact to regional authorities. The MMCCs can serve as such a focal point because it covers a wide area. When operating on high seas, it is easier to determine which zone to contact vis-à-vis which country to engage.

It was also discussed which type of information should be shared. For example, commercial actors are hesitant to share the names of vessels involved in an incident, because a publication of the name might hurt business interests. Taken together, it is necessary to establish clear protocols and SOPs for information exchange that details who, when, and why information is being shared at a given time, and how and to whom this information is subsequently shared. It was also highlighted that information exchange must be tied clearly to action taken on a particular incident if information exchange is to lead to improved security.

Recommendations:

• The MMCCs should be used to facilitate information sharing: The MMCCs may serve as a focal point of entry to information exchange – both in case of incidents and relating to general enquiries. The MMCCs could be contacted in parallel (not instead of) with other institutions, for example, the MDAT-GOG.
• The contact information of the MMCCs should be made available to commercial ships and captains: The contact information of the MMCCs, manned 24/7, should be included in the company’s instruction to captains to ensure the availability of a single point of contact. The MMCCs and commercial actors should arrange for drill calls to be made to the MMCCs to build confidence.
• Protocols should be established on how information exchange takes place: Stakeholders should agree on lines of communication (who calls who – and when) and on how data and information are treated (regarding the release of vessel names to the public, for example). Data validation should be facilitated by reporting centres.

Capacities: Short-Term and Long-Term

State capacities must be strengthened and root causes to piracy be addressed to counter maritime security threats. This will take many years to achieve and will be depended on a range of other development. The urgent need for short-term solutions can however be addressed through different civilian and military stabilisation efforts.  Therefore, a promising development relates to the utilisation of air forces in maritime security, because it can ensure a rapid response to incidents.

The commercial actors stressed the need for armed guards as a short-term, quick impact response. While this is expensive, complicated, and would require strict guidelines from the states, it was presented as the only solution in the short term that could address commercial concerns. Allowing armed guards could provide a temporary solution until the regional state’s capacities are improved.

Recommendations:

• Armed guards/private security should be allowed onboard civilian vessels until state capacities have been strengthened: This requires strict guidelines and be temporarily until state capacities have been built.
• The MMCC should designate high-risk areas in their zones and produce SOPs for vessels on how they should act in these. The SOPs must be shared with commercial vessels and relevant stakeholders.
• Maritime Trade Transport Corridors and High-Risk Areas should be designated for piracy-prone areas, for example by the MMCCs, and SOPs should be produced on how to response to attacks in these areas.

Way ahead

The seminar was the second initiative of the Maritime Dialogue Platform. The organisers aim to expand upon the format and adjust it accordingly to lessons learned from the seminar and input provided by the participants. CFS hopes to conduct another seminar in Q4 of 2021, with a wider regional focus and expanded participation. The MDP is a project under the Danish Maritime Security Programme in the Gulf of Guinea, a part of the Danish Peace and Stabilisation Fund.